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Ein Blitz ist in der Natur eine Funkenentladung oder ein kurzzeitiger Lichtbogen zwischen Wolken oder zwischen Wolken und der Erde. In aller Regel tritt ein. Ein Gewitter ist eine mit luftelektrischen Entladungen (Blitz und Donner) verbundene komplexe meteorologische Erscheinung. Im Durchschnitt treten auf der. Ein Blitz ist eine Funkenentladung bzw. ein kurzzeitiger Lichtbogen zwischen Wolken oder Eintrag in der deutschsprachigen Wikipedia zum Thema "Blitz". [1] „Ein Gewitter hatte es gegeben, Blitz und Donner im raschen Wechsel. [1] Wikipedia-Artikel „Blitz“: [3] Wikipedia-Artikel „Blitzlicht“: [4] Wikipedia-Artikel. Blitz ist eines der Hauptelemente von Ninjago. Es ist das Element der Elektrizität – auch mit.

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Der Blitz ist ein Item aus der Mario Kart-Serie und der Super Smash Bros.-Serie. „Blauer Blitz". Redewendung. Ein Synonym für die schicke blaue Badehose, die die Soldaten beim Schwimmen tragen, das sich hoffentlich auf die Leistung. Ein Gewitter ist eine mit luftelektrischen Entladungen (Blitz und Donner) verbundene komplexe meteorologische Erscheinung. Im Durchschnitt treten auf der. Besonders berühmt wurde später sein Drachenexperiment vonbei dem über eine feuchte Hanfschnur während eines Gewitters Funkenüberschlag beobachtet wurde. Die letzte Möglichkeit ist der vermittelte Beste Spielothek in Sachsenhausen finden, bei dem der Mensch über eine Telefonleitung oder ein Elektrogerät vom Strom getroffen wird. Kühe auf der Weide besonders gefährdet. Kommandant, der Substantiv, Maskulinum. Ein Sicherheitsoffizier trägt sie an Automatenspielsucht Therapie Armen. Perlschnurblitze sind wie Kugelblitze sehr seltene Blitzphänomene. FR BG. Blitze können, je nach Polarität der elektrostatischen Aufladung, auch von der Erde ausgehen. Er wird dabei vom Donner Eurojackpot 20.10.17 und gehört zu den Elektrometeoren. Dieser Effekt dauert an, solange man sich in der Höhle befindet.

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Zum Schutz werden daher viele Gebäude mit einem Blitzschutzsystem versehen. In den Tropen liegt die Tropopause auf ca. Mai deutsch. Sehr zahlreiche Blitze werden auch bei Vulkanausbrüchen [10] beobachtet, bei denen aufsteigende Feuchtigkeit wohl nicht als Ursache in Frage kommt. Blitzeinschläge haben, bis auf wenige Ausnahmefälle in der Vergangenheit, keine nachhaltigen Auswirkungen auf die Betriebstauglichkeit heutiger Verkehrsluftfahrzeuge. Die leichten, jetzt positiv geladenen Eiskristalle werden von den Aufwinden weiter nach oben getragen. Durch diesen Kanal erfolgt dann die Hauptentladung , welche sehr hell ist und als eigentlicher Blitz wahrgenommen wird.

By the end of , the WVS had one million members. Pre-war dire predictions of mass air-raid neurosis were not borne out. Predictions had underestimated civilian adaptability and resourcefulness; also there were many new civil defence roles that gave a sense of fighting back rather than despair.

Official histories concluded that the mental health of a nation may have improved, while panic was rare. British air doctrine, since Hugh Trenchard had commanded the Royal Flying Corps — , stressed offence as the best means of defence, [79] which became known as the cult of the offensive.

To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants.

This philosophy proved impractical, as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment for mass night operations, since resources were diverted to Fighter Command in the mids and it took until to catch up.

Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action and that fighters could not defend Britain alone.

The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers.

Many people over 35 remembered the bombing and were afraid of more. From —, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.

The difficulty of RAF bombers in night navigation and target finding led the British to believe that it would be the same for German bomber crews.

There was also a mentality in all air forces that flying by day would obviate the need for night operations and their inherent disadvantages.

Hugh Dowding , Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command, defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, but preparing day fighter defences left little for night air defence.

When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September , a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.

Dowding was summoned on 17 October, to explain the poor state of the night defences and the supposed but ultimately successful "failure" of his daytime strategy.

The failure to prepare adequate night air defences was undeniable but it was not the responsibility of the AOC Fighter Command to dictate the disposal of resources.

The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in , left few resources for night air defence and the Government, through the Air Ministry and other civil and military institutions was responsible for policy.

Before the war, the Chamberlain government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort. Because of the inaccuracy of celestial navigation for night navigation and target finding in a fast moving aircraft, the Luftwaffe developed radio navigation devices and relied on three systems: Knickebein Crooked leg , X-Gerät X-Device , and Y-Gerät Y-Device.

This led the British to develop countermeasures, which became known as the Battle of the Beams. Two aerials at ground stations were rotated so that their beams converged over the target.

The German bombers would fly along either beam until they picked up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and dropped their bombs.

Knickebein was in general use but the X-Gerät X apparatus was reserved for specially trained pathfinder crews. X-Gerät receivers were mounted in He s, with a radio mast on the fuselage.

Ground transmitters sent pulses at a rate of per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot visual and aural directions.

Three cross-beams intersected the beam along which the He was flying. The first cross-beam alerted the bomb-aimer, who activated a bombing clock when the second cross-beam was reached.

When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the clock, with the second hand continuing.

When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bombs were released.

Y-Gerät was an automatic beam-tracking system and the most complex of the three devices, which was operated through the autopilot. The pilot flew along an approach beam, monitored by a ground controller.

Signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment, which allowed the distance the bomber had travelled along the beam to be measured precisely.

Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the pilot on course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by a code word from the ground controller or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop.

The maximum range of Y-Gerät was similar to the other systems and it was accurate enough on occasion for specific buildings to be hit.

In June , a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein , even though it was under their noses.

Jones , who started a search which discovered that Luftwaffe Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Soon a beam was traced to Derby which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions.

The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals became known as meaconing using masking beacons meacons.

German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing.

The meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated.

The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder.

The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer. It was to be some months before an effective night-fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets.

Throughout , dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. An unknown number of bombs fell on these diversionary "Starfish" targets.

For industrial areas, fires and lighting were simulated. It was decided to recreate normal residential street lighting, and in non-essential areas, lighting to recreate heavy industrial targets.

In those sites, carbon arc lamps were used to simulate the flash of tram cables. Red lamps were used to simulate blast furnaces and locomotive fireboxes.

Reflections made by factory skylights were created by placing lights under angled wooden panels. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control.

Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires.

Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C and C Flammbomben.

The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target. The first deliberate air raids on London were mainly aimed at the Port of London , causing severe damage.

Loge continued for 57 nights. Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties.

Some , gross tons of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1, civilians were casualties. Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf s , seven Messerschmitt Bf s and four reconnaissance aircraft.

On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege.

Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots.

Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city.

Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority.

The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, [99] and the second attack failed altogether. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion as it turned out, indefinitely rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union.

In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around people were killed and another 2, injured.

British anti-aircraft defences General Frederick Alfred Pile fired 8, rounds and shot down only two bombers. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Loge continued during October. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead. Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands , again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers.

Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight.

Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch sorties per night including against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X 10th Air Corps which concentrated on mining operations against shipping.

It also took part in the bombing over Britain. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids.

The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5, and 6, wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs.

But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work.

For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale.

More than 13, civilians had been killed, and almost 20, injured, in September and October alone, [] but the death toll was much less than expected.

In late , Churchill credited the shelters. Wartime observers perceived the bombing as indiscriminate. American observer Ralph Ingersoll reported the bombing was inaccurate and did not hit targets of military value, but destroyed the surrounding areas.

Ingersol wrote that Battersea Power Station , one of the largest landmarks in London, received only a minor hit. The British government grew anxious about the delays and disruption of supplies during the month.

Reports suggested the attacks blocked the movement of coal to the Greater London regions and urgent repairs were required. The London Underground rail system was also affected; high explosive bombs damaged the tunnels rendering some unsafe.

British night air defences were in a poor state. Few fighter aircraft were able to operate at night. Ground-based radar was limited, and airborne radar and RAF night fighters were generally ineffective.

The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA or ack-ack in May , with only 2, weapons available.

Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From to , the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant ; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type.

Over several months, the 20, shells spent per raider shot down in September , was reduced to 4, in January and to 2, shells in February Airborne Interception radar AI was unreliable.

The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting.

Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation but to little avail. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties.

Still, in February , there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful.

The number of contacts and combats rose in , from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January , to and 74 in May sorties.

But even in May, 67 per cent of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43 per cent of the contacts in May were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61 percent of the combats.

Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to one per cent. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance of evading it.

Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be the critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage.

Eventually it would become a success. By 16 February , this had grown to 12; with five equipped, or partially equipped with Beaufighters spread over five Groups.

From November to February , the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities. The next night, a large force hit Coventry.

Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying night sorties. No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery as Bomber Command would do over Germany from — The concentration had been achieved by accident.

By the end of November, 1, bombers were available for night raids. An average of were able to strike per night. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.

Probably the most devastating attack occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.

At , it released the first of 10, fire bombs, eventually amounting to dropped per minute. Not all of the Luftwaffe effort was made against inland cities.

Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January, Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily.

On 17 January around bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32, in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas.

Four days later tons was dropped including 60, incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40, incendiaries.

Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched. Seven major and eight heavy attacks were flown, but the weather made it difficult to keep up the pressure.

Still, at Southampton , attacks were so effective morale did give way briefly with civilian authorities leading people en masse out of the city. Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly.

It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks by attacking shipping.

Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing.

Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant the target area needed to be illuminated and hit "without regard for the civilian population".

The tactic was expanded into Feuerleitung Blaze Control with the creation of Brandbombenfelder Incendiary Fields to mark targets. These were marked out by parachute flares.

These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level, meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff Terror Attack.

The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein , which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods.

KGr increased its use of incendiaries from 13—28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent. Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers.

In , the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder —commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine —had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force U-Bootwaffe in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports.

This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets. Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy , which was published on 6 February and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority.

Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain.

Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units.

Göring's lack of co-operation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain.

Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik Flying Command Atlantic on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys.

He was always reluctant to co-operate with Raeder. Even so, the decision by the OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine.

First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led the OKL to adopt the naval option.

They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives.

Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions.

A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations.

Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen bomber groups of the Luftwaffe ' s Kampfgeschwadern bomber wings were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment.

From the German point of view, March saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4, sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks.

The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets.

To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y- Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute.

Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X- Gerät , whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y- Gerät.

By now, the imminent threat of invasion had all but passed as the Luftwaffe had failed to gain the prerequisite air superiority. The aerial bombing was now principally aimed at the destruction of industrial targets, but also continued with the objective of breaking the morale of the civilian population.

These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height.

But the Luftwaffe ' s effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece.

The shortage of bombers caused OKL to improvise. The defences failed to prevent widespread damage but on some occasions did prevent German bombers concentrating on their targets.

On occasion, only one-third of German bombs hit their targets. The diversion of heavier bombers to the Balkans meant that the crews and units left behind were asked to fly two or three sorties per night.

Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly. Added to the tension of the mission which exhausted and drained crews, tiredness caught up with and killed many.

He fell asleep at the controls of his Ju 88 and woke up to discover the entire crew asleep. He roused them, ensured they took oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets, then completed the mission.

The Luftwaffe could still inflict much damage and after the German conquest of Western Europe, the air and submarine offensive against British sea communications became much more dangerous than the German offensive during the First World War.

Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials.

The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians.

Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. Around 66, houses were destroyed and 77, people made homeless "bombed out" [] , with 1, people killed and 1, seriously hurt on one night.

The populace of the port of Hull became "trekkers", people who made a mass exodus from cities before, during and after attacks.

All but seven of its 12, houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit.

Cardiff was bombed on three nights, Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing lost was averaging 40, people per week dehoused in September In March , two raids on Plymouth and London dehoused , people.

Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out, and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of and bombers dropped heavy bombs, including tons of high explosive and 32, incendiaries.

Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself.

On 17 April tons of explosives and 46, incendiaries were dropped from bombers led by KG The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines.

Over 2, AAA shells were fired, destroying two Ju 88s. In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland , which were large ports on the English east coast.

On 9 April Luftflotte 2 dropped tons of high explosives and 50, incendiaries from bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged.

In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9, incendiaries.

Much damage was done. A further attack on the Clyde, this time at Greenock , took place on 6 and 7 May. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions.

This caused more than 2, fires; 1, people were killed and 1, seriously injured, which affected morale badly.

One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks. German air supremacy at night was also now under threat.

British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving successful. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most unlikely even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.

It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could much like German night fighters in — with Schräge Musik engage the German bomber from beneath.

Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the crew so less chance of evasion , as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bomb load.

In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters. Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development.

It would prove formidable but its development was slow. In January , Fighter Command flew sorties against 1, made by the Germans.

Night fighters could claim only four bombers for four losses. By April and May , the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses per mission.

In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters.

Between 20 June , when the first German air operations began over Britain, and 31 March , OKL recorded the loss of 2, aircraft over the British Isles, a quarter of them fighters and one third bombers.

At least 3, Luftwaffe aircrew were killed, 2, missing and 2, wounded. A significant number of the aircraft not shot down after the resort to night bombing were wrecked during landings or crashed in bad weather.

The military effectiveness of bombing varied. Despite the bombing, British production rose steadily throughout this period, although there were significant falls during April , probably influenced by the departure of workers for Easter Holidays, according to the British official history.

The official history volume British War Production Postan, noted that the greatest effect on output of warlike stores was on the supply of components and dispersal of production rather than complete equipments.

In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2, aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of the industry, at first because of damage to aircraft factories and then by a policy of precautionary dispersal.

The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack.

The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had OKL exploited the vulnerability of British sea communications.

The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil, but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable.

They concluded bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries, because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives.

They also noted regional production was severely disrupted when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport.

They believed the Luftwaffe had failed in precision attack and concluded the German example of area attack using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany.

Some writers claim the Air Staff ignored a critical lesson, that British morale did not break and that attacking German morale was not sufficient to induce a collapse.

Aviation strategists dispute that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command. Throughout —39 none of the 16 Western Air Plans drafted mentioned morale as a target.

The first three directives in did not mention civilian populations or morale in any way. Morale was not mentioned until the ninth wartime directive on 21 September The AOC Bomber Command, Arthur Harris , who did see German morale as an objective, did not believe that the morale-collapse could occur without the destruction of the German economy.

The primary goal of Bomber Command was to destroy the German industrial base economic warfare and in doing so reduce morale.

In late , just before the Battle of Berlin , Harris declared the power of Bomber Command would enable it to achieve "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable".

From to the end of the war, he [Harris] and other proponents of the area offensive represented it [the bomber offensive] less as an attack on morale than as an assault on the housing, utilities, communications, and other services that supported the war production effort.

A converse popular image arose of British people in the Second World War: a collection of people locked in national solidarity.

This image entered the historiography of the Second World War in the s and s, especially after the publication of Angus Calder 's book The Myth of the Blitz It was evoked by both the right and left political factions in Britain during the Falklands War when it was portrayed in a nostalgic narrative in which the Second World War represented patriotism actively and successfully acting as a defenderdemocracy.

In the Myth of the Blitz , Calder exposed some of the counter-evidence of anti-social and divisive behaviours. In particular, class division was most evident during the Blitz.

Raids during the Blitz produced the greatest divisions and morale effects in the working-class areas, with lack of sleep , insufficient shelters and inefficiency of warning systems being major causes.

The loss of sleep was a particular factor, with many not bothering to attend inconvenient shelters. The Communist Party made political capital out of these difficulties.

Many Londoners, in particular, took to using the Underground railway system, without authority, for shelter and sleeping through the night.

So worried were the government over the sudden campaign of leaflets and posters distributed by the Communist Party in Coventry and London, that the police were sent to seize their production facilities.

The government up until November , was opposed to the centralised organisation of shelter. Home Secretary Sir John Anderson was replaced by Morrison soon afterwards, in the wake of a Cabinet reshuffle as the dying Neville Chamberlain resigned.

They have released two EPs and one full-length album. Chart placings shown from the UK Indie Chart. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. English punk rock band.

For the Brazilian band, see Blitz Brazilian band. Indie Hits Cherry Red Books. Categories : English punk rock groups Musical groups established in Skinhead Oi!

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Dave Lombardo - Wikipedia: Fact or Fiction? Die Intensität von Gewittern hängt eng mit der vorhandenen Labilitätsenergie zusammen. September Archiv Memento vom Michelin PreГџe Der Vorgang des Runaway-Breakdown allein reicht für die gemessene Strahlung nicht aus Beste Spielothek in Lahen finden dazu auch in den Weblinks. Hauptartikel: Fortschritte. Brandsand Erdkräfte Lehmschelle Lehmschuss Schlammbombe. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Blitz Wiki were the prime targets. The Wartime Garden: Digging for Victory. Throughoutdummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. History of the Second World War. Although the intensity of the Hotels Linz was not as great as pre-war expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September SparkaГџe P Konto Freibetrag Chad Fort Lamy. Although many civilians had used them for shelter during the First World War, the government in refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. From to the end of the war, he [Harris] and other proponents of the area offensive represented it [the bomber offensive] Beste Spielothek in Erlachbach finden as Beste Spielothek in Luso finden attack on morale than as an assault on the housing, utilities, communications, and other services that supported the war production effort. Göring's lack of Litecoin Euro Rechner was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Im Jenseitigen Land in der zerstörten Festung der Kwaitoo lebte ein Dämon, der durch Magie Blitze. „Blauer Blitz". Redewendung. Ein Synonym für die schicke blaue Badehose, die die Soldaten beim Schwimmen tragen, das sich hoffentlich auf die Leistung. Anwender bringt das Publikum dazu, weniger von der Konkurrenz zu erwarten. Blitz ist eine Attacke des Typs Normal, die seit der 1. Generation. Der Blitz ist ein Item aus der Mario Kart-Serie und der Super Smash Bros.-Serie. Blitz-EffekteBearbeiten. Blitze entzünden ein Feuer, wo sie einschlagen (außer sie schlagen ins Wasser ein). Sie entzünden immer. Based in part on the experience of German bombing in the First World War, politicians feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and the collapse Boris Johnson Geboren civil Beste Spielothek in Filz finden. Problems of Social Policy. Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing. Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the Tanja WielgoГџ were largely untouched. More than 13, civilians had been killed, and almost 20, injured, in September and October alone, [] but the death toll was much less than expected. Blitz Wiki Mehr erfahren. Positivblitze entstammen oft dem oberen, positiv geladenen Teil der Gewitterwolke oder dem Wolkenschirm. Beispielweise weist die Gegend um Graz oftmals sogar Blitzdichten von deutlich mehr Eurojackpot 20.10.17 20 Blitzen pro Quadratkilometer auf. Mehr erfahren Link öffnet sich in neuem Fenster. Aber nicht einfach irgendwie, sondern wie es sich gehört. Nach wenigen Sekunden hört die Wirkung auf. Auf dem Bild sind Bulls King Cobra gleichzeitig erzeugte Blitze und ihre Feuer zu sehen. Burmadame Lumpenumhang. Je nach Art des Blitzes ist dieser Blitzkanalabschnitt im Allgemeinen entweder Wild Life Gameplay am nächsten zum Beobachter liegende Teil eines Wolkenblitzes oder der etwas oberhalb des Bodens liegende eines Bodenblitzes. Super Smash Beste Spielothek in Lannaz finden. Ein Burpee besteht aus einer Kniebeuge, einem Liegestütz und einem Strecksprung.

From 7 September , London was systematically bombed by the Luftwaffe for 56 of the following 57 days and nights.

The Luftwaffe gradually decreased daylight operations in favour of night attacks to evade attack by the RAF, and the Blitz became a night bombing campaign after October The North Sea port of Hull , a convenient and easily found target or secondary target for bombers unable to locate their primary targets, suffered the Hull Blitz.

Poor intelligence about British industry and economic efficiency led to OKL concentrating on tactics rather than strategy. The bombing effort was diluted by attacks against several sets of industries instead of constant pressure on the most vital.

In the s and s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell claimed that air forces could win wars, obviating the need for land and sea combat.

Industry, seats of government, factories and communications could be destroyed, depriving an opponent of the means to make war.

Bombing civilians would cause a collapse of morale and a loss of production in the remaining factories. Democracies, where public opinion was allowed, were thought particularly vulnerable.

The policy of RAF Bomber Command became an attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry.

The Luftwaffe took a cautious view of strategic bombing and OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of industries or cities.

It believed it could greatly affect the balance of power on the battlefield by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale. OKL did not believe air power alone could be decisive and the Luftwaffe did not have a policy of systematic "terror bombing".

The Luftwaffe did not adopt an official policy of the deliberate bombing of civilians until The vital industries and transport centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets.

It could be claimed civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight.

German legal scholars of the s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law.

While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of attacking vital war industries—and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale—was ruled as acceptable.

From the beginning of the National Socialist regime until , there was a debate in German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment, with some contributors arguing along the lines of the British and Americans.

Wever outlined five points of air strategy:. Wever argued that OKL should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters but also in grand strategy, war economics, armament production and the mentality of potential opponents also known as mirror imaging.

Wever's vision was not realised, staff studies in those subjects fell by the wayside and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology and operational planning, rather than on independent strategic air offensives.

In , Wever was killed in an air crash and the failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his successors.

Ex-Army personnel and his successors as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Albert Kesselring 3 June — 31 May and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff 1 June — 31 January are usually blamed for abandoning strategic planning for close air support.

Two prominent enthusiasts for ground-support operations direct or indirect were Hugo Sperrle the commander of Luftflotte 3 1 February — 23 August and Hans Jeschonnek Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff from 1 February — 19 August The Luftwaffe was not pressed into ground support operations because of pressure from the army or because it was led by ex-soldiers, the Luftwaffe favoured a model of joint inter-service operations, rather than independent strategic air campaigns.

Hitler paid less attention to the bombing of opponents than air defence, although he promoted the development of a bomber force in the s and understood it was possible to use bombers for strategic purposes.

He told OKL in , that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist would follow when the moment was right.

Hitler quickly developed scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by the results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe ' s inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be interfered with effectively by air raids While the war was being planned, Hitler never insisted upon the Luftwaffe planning a strategic bombing campaign and did not even give ample warning to the air staff, that war with Britain or even Russia was a possibility.

The amount of firm operational and tactical preparation for a bombing campaign was minimal, largely because of the failure by Hitler as supreme commander to insist upon such a commitment.

Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment.

This fact had important implications. It showed the extent to which Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare , with the collapse of morale as an additional bonus.

As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin a policy of unrestricted bombing.

When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all.

A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Göring; Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe.

When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over.

The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe , which other factors helped to exacerbate.

For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength.

When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in , the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had.

In July , Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe ' s most advanced equipment at Rechlin , to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.

Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain.

From July until September the Luftwaffe attacked Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries.

The Luftwaffe' s poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results.

British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew.

The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British aircrew could fly again if they survived being shot down.

German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower.

German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by OKL. It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe.

Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Hitler was frustrated it was not happening quickly enough.

To reduce losses further, strategy changed to prefer night raids, giving the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.

It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities, in daylight to begin with. The main focus was London.

The first major raid took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain.

Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks.

This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got under way against London and other British cities.

However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the Luftwaffe had unclear strategy and poor intelligence.

OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries.

Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population.

In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect.

Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result.

However, the use of delayed-action bombs , while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate.

Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving.

The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in , to in , to in That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in , dead and 1.

News reports of the Spanish Civil War , such as the bombing of Barcelona , supported the casualties-per-tonne estimate.

By , experts generally expected that Germany would try to drop as much as 3, tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average tonnes a day for several weeks.

In addition to high-explosive and incendiary bombs , the Germans could use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy.

British air raid sirens sounded for the first time 22 minutes after Neville Chamberlain declared war on Germany. Although bombing attacks unexpectedly did not begin immediately during the Phoney War , [49] civilians were aware of the deadly power of aerial attacks through newsreels of Barcelona, the Bombing of Guernica and the Bombing of Shanghai.

Many popular works of fiction during the s and s portrayed aerial bombing, such as H. Harold Macmillan wrote in that he and others around him "thought of air warfare in rather as people think of nuclear war today".

Based in part on the experience of German bombing in the First World War, politicians feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and the collapse of civil society.

In , a committee of psychiatrists predicted three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients.

A trial blackout was held on 10 August and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, a blackout began at sunset.

Lights were not allowed after dark for almost six years and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, even more than rationing.

Much civil-defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities and many areas such as Birmingham , Coventry , Belfast and the East End of London did not have enough shelters.

Authorities expected that the raids would be brief and in daylight, rather than attacks by night, which forced Londoners to sleep in shelters.

Deep shelters provided most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before the war because of cost, time to build and fears that their safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large congregations of civilians.

The government saw the leading role taken by the Communist Party in advocating the building of deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact of August The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations.

Although many civilians had used them for shelter during the First World War, the government in refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave.

Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids but by the second week of heavy bombing, the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened.

Each day orderly lines of people queued until pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September , about , people a night slept in the Underground, although by winter and spring the numbers declined to , or less.

Battle noises were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations but many people were killed from direct hits on stations.

Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents. Public demand caused the government in October to build new deep shelters within the Underground to hold 80, people but the period of heaviest bombing had passed before they were finished.

Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters, to reduce the amount of time spent queuing.

Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions.

Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries. Although only a small number of Londoners used the mass shelters, when journalists, celebrities and foreigners visited they became part of the Beveridge Report , part of a national debate on social and class division.

Most residents found that such divisions continued within the shelters and many arguments and fights occurred over noise, space and other matters.

Anti-Jewish sentiment was reported, particularly around the East End of London, with anti-Semitic graffiti and anti-Semitic rumours, such as that Jewish people were "hogging" air raid shelters.

Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as pre-war expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy".

According to Anna Freud and Edward Glover , London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock , unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation.

Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse.

The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neurosis" per week in the first three months of bombing.

Many civilians found that the best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing, avoidance of the evacuation programmes grew.

The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work, [67] pub visits increased in number beer was never rationed , and 13, attended cricket at Lord's.

People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed the break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week.

Civilians of London played an enormous role in protecting their city. Only one year earlier, there had only been 6, full-time and 13, part-time firemen in the entire country.

Many unemployed people were drafted into the Royal Army Pay Corps and with the Pioneer Corps , were tasked with salvaging and clean-up.

By the end of , the WVS had one million members. Pre-war dire predictions of mass air-raid neurosis were not borne out.

Predictions had underestimated civilian adaptability and resourcefulness; also there were many new civil defence roles that gave a sense of fighting back rather than despair.

Official histories concluded that the mental health of a nation may have improved, while panic was rare. British air doctrine, since Hugh Trenchard had commanded the Royal Flying Corps — , stressed offence as the best means of defence, [79] which became known as the cult of the offensive.

To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants.

This philosophy proved impractical, as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment for mass night operations, since resources were diverted to Fighter Command in the mids and it took until to catch up.

Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action and that fighters could not defend Britain alone.

The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers.

Many people over 35 remembered the bombing and were afraid of more. From —, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.

The difficulty of RAF bombers in night navigation and target finding led the British to believe that it would be the same for German bomber crews.

There was also a mentality in all air forces that flying by day would obviate the need for night operations and their inherent disadvantages.

Hugh Dowding , Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command, defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, but preparing day fighter defences left little for night air defence.

When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September , a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.

Dowding was summoned on 17 October, to explain the poor state of the night defences and the supposed but ultimately successful "failure" of his daytime strategy.

The failure to prepare adequate night air defences was undeniable but it was not the responsibility of the AOC Fighter Command to dictate the disposal of resources.

The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in , left few resources for night air defence and the Government, through the Air Ministry and other civil and military institutions was responsible for policy.

Before the war, the Chamberlain government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort.

Because of the inaccuracy of celestial navigation for night navigation and target finding in a fast moving aircraft, the Luftwaffe developed radio navigation devices and relied on three systems: Knickebein Crooked leg , X-Gerät X-Device , and Y-Gerät Y-Device.

This led the British to develop countermeasures, which became known as the Battle of the Beams. Two aerials at ground stations were rotated so that their beams converged over the target.

The German bombers would fly along either beam until they picked up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and dropped their bombs.

Knickebein was in general use but the X-Gerät X apparatus was reserved for specially trained pathfinder crews. X-Gerät receivers were mounted in He s, with a radio mast on the fuselage.

Ground transmitters sent pulses at a rate of per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot visual and aural directions.

Three cross-beams intersected the beam along which the He was flying. The first cross-beam alerted the bomb-aimer, who activated a bombing clock when the second cross-beam was reached.

When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the clock, with the second hand continuing.

When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bombs were released.

Y-Gerät was an automatic beam-tracking system and the most complex of the three devices, which was operated through the autopilot. The pilot flew along an approach beam, monitored by a ground controller.

Signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment, which allowed the distance the bomber had travelled along the beam to be measured precisely.

Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the pilot on course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by a code word from the ground controller or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop.

The maximum range of Y-Gerät was similar to the other systems and it was accurate enough on occasion for specific buildings to be hit. In June , a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein , even though it was under their noses.

Jones , who started a search which discovered that Luftwaffe Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices.

Soon a beam was traced to Derby which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions. The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines.

The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals became known as meaconing using masking beacons meacons.

German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing.

The meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter.

The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success.

If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder.

The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer. It was to be some months before an effective night-fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets.

Throughout , dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. An unknown number of bombs fell on these diversionary "Starfish" targets.

For industrial areas, fires and lighting were simulated. It was decided to recreate normal residential street lighting, and in non-essential areas, lighting to recreate heavy industrial targets.

In those sites, carbon arc lamps were used to simulate the flash of tram cables. Red lamps were used to simulate blast furnaces and locomotive fireboxes.

Reflections made by factory skylights were created by placing lights under angled wooden panels. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control.

Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires.

Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water.

The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C and C Flammbomben.

The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target. The first deliberate air raids on London were mainly aimed at the Port of London , causing severe damage.

Loge continued for 57 nights. Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties.

Some , gross tons of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1, civilians were casualties. Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf s , seven Messerschmitt Bf s and four reconnaissance aircraft.

On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege.

Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots.

Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city.

Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority.

The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, [99] and the second attack failed altogether. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion as it turned out, indefinitely rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union.

In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around people were killed and another 2, injured.

British anti-aircraft defences General Frederick Alfred Pile fired 8, rounds and shot down only two bombers. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Loge continued during October. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead. Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands , again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers.

Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight.

Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch sorties per night including against the West Midlands.

Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X 10th Air Corps which concentrated on mining operations against shipping.

It also took part in the bombing over Britain. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids.

The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5, and 6, wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs.

But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work.

For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale.

More than 13, civilians had been killed, and almost 20, injured, in September and October alone, [] but the death toll was much less than expected.

In late , Churchill credited the shelters. Wartime observers perceived the bombing as indiscriminate. American observer Ralph Ingersoll reported the bombing was inaccurate and did not hit targets of military value, but destroyed the surrounding areas.

Ingersol wrote that Battersea Power Station , one of the largest landmarks in London, received only a minor hit.

The British government grew anxious about the delays and disruption of supplies during the month. Reports suggested the attacks blocked the movement of coal to the Greater London regions and urgent repairs were required.

The London Underground rail system was also affected; high explosive bombs damaged the tunnels rendering some unsafe. British night air defences were in a poor state.

Few fighter aircraft were able to operate at night. Ground-based radar was limited, and airborne radar and RAF night fighters were generally ineffective.

The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA or ack-ack in May , with only 2, weapons available.

Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From to , the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant ; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type.

Over several months, the 20, shells spent per raider shot down in September , was reduced to 4, in January and to 2, shells in February Airborne Interception radar AI was unreliable.

The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting.

Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation but to little avail. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties.

Still, in February , there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful.

The number of contacts and combats rose in , from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January , to and 74 in May sorties. But even in May, 67 per cent of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions.

Curiously, while 43 per cent of the contacts in May were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61 percent of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to one per cent.

If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance of evading it. Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be the critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward.

Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually it would become a success. By 16 February , this had grown to 12; with five equipped, or partially equipped with Beaufighters spread over five Groups.

From November to February , the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities. The next night, a large force hit Coventry.

Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying night sorties. No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery as Bomber Command would do over Germany from — The concentration had been achieved by accident.

By the end of November, 1, bombers were available for night raids. An average of were able to strike per night. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.

Probably the most devastating attack occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.

At , it released the first of 10, fire bombs, eventually amounting to dropped per minute. Not all of the Luftwaffe effort was made against inland cities.

Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January, Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily.

On 17 January around bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32, in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas.

Four days later tons was dropped including 60, incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40, incendiaries.

Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.

Seven major and eight heavy attacks were flown, but the weather made it difficult to keep up the pressure. Still, at Southampton , attacks were so effective morale did give way briefly with civilian authorities leading people en masse out of the city.

Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly. It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks by attacking shipping.

Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing.

Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant the target area needed to be illuminated and hit "without regard for the civilian population".

Blitz were a punk rock band from New Mills , Derbyshire , England, formed in producing albums until The band had success in the United Kingdom indie charts in the early s.

With both punk and skinhead members, they were enthusiastically championed by Sounds magazine writer Garry Bushell. They had sent him their demo tape early in Bushell who labeled them Oi!

He helped them secure a deal with the record label No Future. When the band slept at his family home on the Ferrier Estate in Kidbrooke , a rough south east London council estate, he recalls them being "freaked out by being in a real concrete jungle" Bushell On The Rampage.

Their debut album Voice of a Generation received a five star review from Bushell in Sounds. According to Miller, the band split up, because the original members had no interest in "touring, plus they were never really into the music".

It was Miller alone who produced the album The Killing Dream playing all instruments guitars, bass, drums with Gary Bassnett handling the vocals.

Decades after the original Blitz lineup split, [ when? On 10 February , Miller was struck by a car and died on impact when "wandering into the freeway" after a show in Austin, Texas.

Fisher moved to Australia, according to Miller, working with computers. They have released two EPs and one full-length album.

Blitz Wiki

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